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This legislative comment on the European Trade 
Mark Directive focuses on the trade mark infringement 
provision of Art.5-5. In view of the Benelux background 
and the European negotiating process of the Directive, it 
is contended that the omission of a "use in commerce" 
requirement in Art. 5-5 is an unfortunate mistake, which 
extends the scope of trade mark infringement to non-
trade situations and could jeopardise freedom of speech. 
Owing to recent developments regarding the new 2005 
Benelux IP Treaty and the 2005 approval process of the 
European Constitution, the author proposes that the 
Benelux and Europe should finally confront, assess and 
resolve the Art.5-5 controversy and its omission of a use 
in commerce requirement. 
The European Trade Mark Directive 
The European Trade Mark Directive dates back to 
1988 and is a well-known piece of legislation, both in 
and outside the EU.' The Directive aims to harmonise 
national trade mark laws of all EU Member States. It 
provides for uniform rules regarding the registrability 
and (un)lawful use of (registered) trade marks. Article 
5 contains the rules for trade mark infringement and 
protects trade mark owners against (identical or similar) 
signs that create (a likelihood of) confusion with, are 
detrimental against, or take unfair advantage of (the 
distinctive character or reputation of) the registered 
trade mark. 2 The scope of trade mark infringement is 
* Alexander Tsoutsanis is a lawyer with Kios Morel Vas & Schaap 
in Amsterdam and also teaches intellectual property law at Leiden 
University. The author would like to thank Professor William Wang~ 
University of California~ Hastings College of the Law~ for helpful 
editon'al comments. 
1 First Council Directive 89/104 to approximate the laws of 
Member States relating to trade marks [1989] 0.]. LAO/I. 
2 Compare the text of Art.5-1 and Art.5-2 European Trade 
Mark Directive. Art.5-1: 
carefully defined by Art. 5, and is further narrowed down 
by the limitations of Arts 6 and 7 of the Directive. 
Trade mark infringement: the "use in 
commerce" requirement 
Article 5 itself contains important limitations to the 
scope of trade mark infringement, since Art.5-1 and 5-2 
require both "use in commerce" and "use as a trade 
mark". Both requirements follow from the traditional 
conception of a trade mark used in the course of trade 
for the purpose of distinguishing goods or services. 
Both requirements are widely accepted, both in Art. 16-
1 TRIPs, Art.9-1 Community Trade Mark Regulation 
("CTMR"), and in many EU Member States.' In other 
words: infringing use must be "in the course of trade". 4 
This use in commerce requirement has been 
interpreted by the European Court of Justice in Arsenal 
v Reed as use "in the context of commercial activity 
with a view to economic advantage and not as a private 
matter". 5 
1988 and the erroneous exception: Art.5-5 
Article 5-5 contains an exception to these obvious 
requirements and also allows for trade mark protection: 
"against the use of a sign other than for the purposes 
of distinguishing goods or services, where use of that 
"The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor 
exclusive rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to 
prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in 
the course of trade: (a) any sign which is identical with the trade 
mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with 
those for which the trade mark is registered; Cb) any sign where, 
because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and 
the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the 
trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion 
on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of 
association between the sign and the trade mark." 
Art.5-2: 
"Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall 
be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent 
from using in the course of trade any sign which is identical 
with, or similar to, the trade mari, in relation to goods or 
services which are not similar to those for which the trade 
mark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in the 
Member State and where use of that sign without due cause 
takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive 
character or the repute of the trade mark." 
3 Compare the "use in commerce" requirements in the trade 
mark infringement provisions of §14-2 German Trade Mark 
Act (Markengesetz) which confines trade mark infringement to 
"geschafdichen Verkehr"; §20-1 Italian IP Code (Codice dei Din"tto 
di Proprieta Industriale) which is confined to "usare nell'auivita 
ecollomica"; §14 Irish Trade Marks Act which is confined to "use 
in the course of trade"; and §34 of the Spanish Trade Mark Act 
(Ley de Marcas), which is confined to "el traftco economico". The 
same applies mutatis mutandis to other EU jurisdictions. 
4 ]. Phillips, Trade Mark Law. A practical anatomy (2003), 
para.7.38. 
5 Arsenal v Reed, (C-206/01): ECJ November 12, 2002, at 
[40]. Also compare the opinion of Attorney-General Ruiz Jarabo 
Colomer (C-206/01, ECJ June 13, 2002) at [591, [62], [64J and 
his opinion for AnsulvAjax (C-40/01 July 2, 2002) at [46]-[48], 
[57]. See for a further analysis of Arsenal v Reed and the question 
whether use "in the course of trade" is embodied in the standard 
of "trade mark use": Phillips, fn.4 above, at §§7.40-7.51A, and 
previously Ch. Gielen and N. Hagemans, Kort begrip van het 
intellectuele eigendomsrecht (1993), p.142. 
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sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is 
detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of 
the trade mark", 
This is a remarkable provision, which goes beyond 
key limitations of trade mark infringement, because 
(1) Art.5-5 extends the scope of trade mark infringement 
to use "other than for the purposes of distinguishing 
goods or services"; and (2) because Art.5-5 does not 
mention-and is therefore not restricted to-"use in the 
course of trade". 
The 2003 rebuttal: why Art.S-S is wrong 
In 2003 the Dutch IP review Bijblad bij de Industriiile 
Eigendom published an article which claimed that Art.5-
5 of the European Trade Mark Directive was wrong, 
because it failed to mention the "use in commerce" 
requirement. 6 This claim was based on a number of 
grounds, including: (1) the underlying negotiations of 
the Directive which showed that Art.5-5 was proposed 
and inspired by the Benelux; (2) the fact that the 
(old) Benelux provision of Art.13-A2 Benelux Trade 
Mark Act ("BTA") did have a "use in commerce" 
requirement; (3) the remarkable difference between 
Art.5-1 and 5-2 of the Directive; (4) the commercial 
nature of trade mark (law); and (5) the potential 
negative impact on freedom of speech and society as 
a whole. These grounds will be discussed further below. 
1971 and the Benelux background: trade 
mark infringement 
The Benelux Trade Mark Act dates back to 1971 and 
provides uniform and unified trade mark legislation for 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The rules 
for trade mark infringement were set out in Art. 13 BTA, 
which contained two infringement provisions 7 : 
"Article 13 
A. Without prejudice to the possible application of 
ordinary civil law in matters of civil liability } the proprietor 
of a mark may, by virtue of his exclusive right, oppose: 
1. any use made of the mark or of a like symbol for 
the goods or services in respect of which the mark is 
registered, or for similar goods or services; 
2. any other use, in economic intercourse, of the mark 
or of a like symbol made without a valid reason under 
circumstances likely to be prejudicial to the proprietor 
of the mark." 
Under the old Benelux Trade Mark Act the "use in 
commerce" requirement was only mentioned in Art. 13-
A2 (the rather awkward official English translation 
refers to "use in economic intercourse"). The other 
infringement provision of Art.13-Al did not have an 
explicit "use in commerce" requirement.8 Article 13-
A2 is of particular importance, because it gives trade 
6 A. Tsoutsanis, "Robe(l)co, artikel 5 lid 5 Merkenrichtlijn en 
economisch verkeer: een fout in de richtlijn?" [2003] Bijblad bi} 
de illduslrii!le eigendom 3-10. 
7 Benelux Trade Mark Act, Trb. 1962,58 Art. 13-Al and 2. 
8 But Art.13-Al BTA was confined to trade mark use, 
which was supposed to be commercial anyway: see Gielen and 
Hagemans, fn.5 above. 
mark owners the right to also act against any other 
(infringing) use which could be detrimental to the trade 
mark and therefore goes beyond the traditional scope of 
trade mark infringement as mentioned in Art.13-Al. 9 
1988 and the Benelux bonanza: negotiating 
the Trade Mark Directive 
Since its establishment in 1957 the creation of a 
common internal market has been one of the (seven) 
main objectives of the European Union. This drive 
for economic integration is explained by the fact 
that the actual European Union started life as the 
European Economic Communities ("EEC"). It was 
quickly recognised that national trade mark laws could 
impede Europe's goal of free movement of goods (and 
services) and could effectively block the creation of a 
common European market. It was therefore no surprise 
that the EU quickly focused on the harmonisation (and 
unification) of national trade mark laws. Although the 
first efforts date back to 1959, it was not until July 
1986 that negotiations for the European Trade Mark 
Directive really took off.1O The negotiations consisted 
of three rounds in which proposals were reviewed and 
debated. 11 
The negotiations on trade mark infringement were 
quite tough. Although time was running out, even after 
three rounds the delegations failed to reach agreement. 
The disagreement centred on two issues on trade mark 
infringement, in which the Benelux favoured (and 
proposed) a broad scope of trade mark infringement, 
which other Member States refused to accept. 12 
The first issue centred on one of the relevant 
criteria for trade mark infringement, which could be 
dubbed the "confusion/association controversy". While 
other Member States were only prepared to allow 
trade mark infringement in the case of a likelihood of 
confusion on the part of the public, the Benelux strongly 
felt that mere likelihood of association was sufficient, 
and (actual or potential) confusion should not be a 
necessary requirement for trade mark infringement. 13 
As often in international diplomacy, both sides settled 
for a compromise and accepted a Benelux proposal 
9 According to the Benelux doctrine examples of use "other 
than for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services" 
traditionally are, inter alia: use as a trade name, use in 
comparative advertising and the registration of a domain name. 
10 Council Working Group July 17-18, 1986, document 
#8653/86 (publication date August 4, 1986). 
11 Looking at the publication dates of the minutes of the 
meetings one could roughly say that the first reading lasted 
from August 4 to October 15, 1986 (Council Working Group 
documents #8653/86 and 9377/86). The second reading was 
from July 13, 1987 to October 2,1987 (Council Working Group 
documents #7528/87 and 8752187). And the third reading was 
conducted from October 19, 1987 to November 16, 1987 
(Council Working Group documents #9049/87 and 9631187). 
12 The Dutch chief negotiators H. R. Furstner and M. C. 
Geuze revealed the Benelux negotiation process and strategy in 
their article "Beschermingsomvang van het merk in de Benelux 
en EEG-harmorusatie" [1988] Bijblad bij de industriele eigendom 
215-220, which E. C. Nooteboom, "Richtlijn merkenrecht 
vastgesteld" (1989) 1 Intellectuele Eigendom en Reclamerecht 7 
fn.3 describes as a "thrilling and all-revealing report of events". 
13 Council Working Group document #9185/87, at pp.5-6 
(publication date October 28,1987). 
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to incorporate both criteria in the same provision. 14 
This compromise is clearly reflected in the text of 
Art.5-lB of the directive. IS By putting both confusion 
and association in the same provision, both sides had 
their own interpretation of Art.5-lB: the Benelux for 
instance was quick to declare victory and-although 
Art.5-lB mentions both criteria-only implemented 
their association standard. 16 The confusion/association 
controversy was finally resolved in 1997 by the 
Puma/Sabel verdict of the European Court of Justice 
("ECJ"), in which it all ended in tears for the Benelux 
(and rightly so)Y The EC} clearly preferred confusion 
over association and the Benelux implementation (of 
only association) proved to be wrong. Although Art.5-
1 B is clearly an example of an unworkable and 
ill-formulated compromise which should have been 
avoided, it is of no particular relevance here, because it 
was always confined to the use in commerce requirement 
of Art.5-l. 
The second issue also pertains to the proper scope 
of trade mark infringement and the Benelux drive to 
export their broad standards into the European Trade 
Mark Directive. This time it was all about the 1971 
Benelux provision of Art. 13-A2, which went beyond the 
traditional scope of trade mark infringement. While 
Benelux trade mark protection was not limited to 
infringing trade mark use, and Art.13-A2 allowed trade 
mark owners to also act against any other (infringing) 
use which could be dettimental to the Benelux trade 
mark (see above), other Member States were reluctant 
to do so. The issue led to clear disagreements and 
fierce negotiations, and the delegations clashed in 
October 1987: a joint proposal by Belgium and the 
Netherlands to incorporate the Art.13-A2 provision 
into the Directive was quickly rejected by the other 
Member States and the European Commission." The 
14 Council Working Group document #9886/87, at pp.2-3 
(publication date November 24, 1987). 
15 See ArtS-IB: 
"The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor 
exclusive rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to 
prevent all third parties not having his consent from using 
in the course of trade: (b) any sign where, because of its 
identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and the identity 
or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade mark 
and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the 
public~ which includes the likelihood of association between the sign 
and the trade marh." 
16 See the 1996 implementation of Arr.13-AIB ETA: 
"Without prejudice to the possible application of ordinary civil 
law in matters of civil liability, the proprietor of a mark may, 
by virtue of his exclusive right, prohibit: Cb) any use in the 
course of trade made of the mark or of a similar sign for goods 
for which the mark is registered or for similar goods where 
there exists a lihelihood of association on the part of the public 
between the sign and the mark." 
17 Puma v Sabel, C-251195 (ECJ, November 11, 1997). See 
the case comment by D. W. F. Verkade in [1998] N.J. 523 
and R. Raas, Het Benelux Merkenrecht en de Eerste Merkenrichdijn: 
overeenstemming over verwam'ng (2000). 
18 Council Working Group document #9185/87, fn.13 above, 
at pp.5-6: 
"The Belgian and Netherlands delegations made their 
acceptance of the approach by the Commission and the 
majority subject to the inclusion in Article 3 of a clause inspired 
by Article l3A of the Benelux law on trade marks. This law, 
as a result of a long judicial evolution, has recognized as rights 
conferred by the trade mark, further to the traditional rights 
Belgian and Dutch negotiators were not amused and 
responded by threatening to withdraw their support for 
the pending Community Trade Mark Regulation, which 
also awaited approval since the 1960s.19 Despite that 
severe threat, the European Commission and a majority 
of the other delegations stuck to their initial refusal 
to incorporate the Benelux provision of Art.13-A2.20 
In October 1987 a serious deadlock in negotiations 
appeared to be inevitable. Mter four weeks of silent 
diplomacy, however, agreement could be reached. The 
delegations resumed negotiations on November 23, 
1987 and it was proposed to add a new s.5 to Art.3 
of the proposal (equivalent to the current Art.5-5 of 
the Directive), which was supposed to safeguard the 
Benelux doctrine of Art. 13-A2 and stated that21 : 
"Paragraph 1 to 4 shall not affect provisions in any 
Member State relating to the protection against the use of 
a sign other than for the purposes of distinguishing goods 
or services, where use of that sign without due cause takes 
unfair advantage of or is detrimental to, the distinctive 
character or the repute of the trade mark" . 
This proposal was quickly accepted by the Belgian and 
Dutch delegation, the Benelux was delighted, and Art.5-
5 has been part of the European Trade Mark Directive 
ever since.22 
recognized in most States, the right to oppose any use of the 
trade mark or a similar sign in the course of trade [sic] and without 
just reason under conditions which might cause prejudice to 
the trade mark owner, This very extensive right confers on the 
owner a protection under trade mark law against acts by third 
parties which, in the other Member States is usually conferred 
under the more restrictive conditions which govern civil liability 
or unfair competition actions. These two delegations consider 
this a fundamental progress in trade mark legislation, highly 
appreciated by their industry, are they are not prepared to give 
it up. 
The other delegations and the Commission were not 
prepared to accept this development contained in the Benelux 
trade mark law as a general rule in the Community. On the 
contrary, in their view, the interests protected by this provision 
are more efficiently protected by the rules of civil liability and 
unfair competition ... ". 
19 Furstner and Geuze, fn.12 above, at p.219; Council 
Working Group document #9185/87, fn.13 above, at p.6: 
"In the light of the position of the majority the Belgian and 
Netherlands delegations indicated that they had accepted 
Article 8 of the draft Regulation for a Community trade 
mark as a compromise establishing the level of protection that 
could be agreed for a Community right. If they were however 
urged to abandon national provisions in the framework of 
harmonization, they might be obliged to reconsider their 
agreement on the solution envisaged for the Community trade 
mark." 
20 Council Working Group document #9185/87, ibid.: "A 
tentative compromise solution by the Presidency to introduce in 
Article 3 the Benelux clause as an option open to the Member 
States was not accepted by the majority of the delegations nor by 
the Commission." 
21 Council Working Group document #9886/87, fn.14 above, 
at p.3: "(5) Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not affect provisions in any 
Member State relating to the protection against the use of a sign 
other than for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services, 
where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage 
of or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of 
the trade mark." 
22 ibid., at p.3: "The Belgian and Netherlands delegations 
considered that these texts would be acceptable within the 
framework of an overall package on all the outstanding problems 
in respect of the Directive." 
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The 1988 result; Art.5-5 
After this, other issues were also quickly dealt with and 
the European Trade Mark Directive was established on 
December 21, 1988.23 The wording of the accepted 
proposal (see above) did not change significantly in the 
closing stages of the negotiating process: it was only 
renumbered from Art.3-5 to Art.5-5, which it still is 
today. 
But today, and acrually since the very first publication 
of Art.5-S, one can wonder why Art.5-S fails to 
incorporate a use in commerce requirement. Especially 
because the analysis of the negotiating process in 
the preceding section clearly shows that Art.5-5 was 
inspired by the 1971 Benelux provision of Art. 13-A2 
BTA which did have a use in commerce requirement 
(see above). The fact that Art.5-5 was proposed and 
inspired by the Benelux is also acknowledged by 
the European Commission and Attorney-General Ruiz 
Jarabo Colomer in the Robe/co/Robeco case." 
Was it a deliberate choice or an unfortunate slip of the 
pen to omit a use in commerce requirement in Art.S~S? 
A deliberate choice seems unlikely, because Workmg 
Group documents and the Benelux report of Furstner 
and Geuze do not refer to any deliberations on this 
subject.25 This is rather strange, because dismissing a key 
requirement for trade mark infringement demands some 
explanation or justification, if explainable or justifiable at 
all. With reference to the use in commerce requirement 
in the Benelux provision of Art. 13-A2, objections should 
have been raised either from the Benelux or from other 
delegations (or members of the European Parliament) 
who could, or should, have pointed out that without 
a use in commerce requirement Art.5-S has a virtual 
unlimited scope for trade mark infringement. 
The doubtful discrepancy with Art.5-1 and 5-2 
of the Directive 
Another reason why objections should have been raised 
against Art.5-5 is the clear discrepancy with Art.5-1 
and 5-2 of the Directive, which both require "use in 
commerce" for trade mark infringement. This is in 
accordance with other fellow provisions such as Art.16-1 
TRIPs and Art.9-1 Community Trade Mark Regulation 
("CTMR") in which "use in commerce" is clearly 
recognised as an obvious requirement for trade mark 
infringement. By failing to mention "use in commerce", 
it is obvious that Art.S-5 is in clear contradiction 
with Art.5-1 and 5-2, which deserves at least some 
justification, either in an explanatory memorandum or 
by the delegations involved in drafting Art.5-5. 
The commercial nature of (the law of) trade 
marks 
Even if there had been some deliberations in the 
negotiating process, the fundamental question arises 
23 Council Directive 89/104, fn.1 above. 
24 Robelco v Robeco, (C-23/01): ECJ, November 21, 2002, 
at [2]; Opinion of Attorney-General Ruiz Jarabo Colomer 
(C-23/0I, ECJ, Ma,eh 21, 2002). 
25 Furstner and Geuze, fn.12 above, at p.219. 
whether the omission of a use in commerce requirement 
in Art.5-5 can be justified at all, especially with regard 
to the commercial nature of trade mark law. 
At the end of the day, trade marks are business 
identifiers and are all about the trade in goods or 
services. It is obvious that trade mark law is a lex 
specialis of trade (or competition) law, which is the 
reason why the harmonisation of trade mark law has 
been such a high priority for the European Economic 
Community since the 1950s.26 The nature of trade mark 
law as a species of competition law is in fact the reason, 
the motive and the justification of current European 
trade mark legislation, as provided in the European 
Trade Mark Directive and the Community Trade Mark 
Regulation." It is also the reason why trade marks 
are mentioned in the 1993 WTO TRIPs Treaty: trade 
marks are all about trade. 28 This obvious commercial 
narure of trade mark law is also acknowledged by the 
Benelux, both in the explanatory memorandum of the 
BTA, by Attorney-General Berger in Tanderil and by 
the Benelux Court of Justice in KIM.29 
National and European legislators are trying to 
express this commercial nature of trade mark law quite 
often by incorporating a use in commerce requirement 
in their trade mark legislation. This was also the case 
in the old Benelux provision of Art.13-A2 BTA (see 
above). Attorney-General Berger is right in Tanderil in 
stating that "this 'use in commerce' -requirement assigns 
trade mark law its place in society: trade and especially 
the competition in the course of trade". 30 The same 
is also acknowledged by Fezer in Germany, who states 
that: 
"just as in competition law the 'use in commerce'-
requirement in trade mark law aims to express that 
competition- and trade mark law is confined to 
commercial competition and aims to regulate the market 
behaviour of companies" .31 
By using a use in commerce requirement, trade mark law 
aims to make a clear distinction with non-commercial 
26 See the 1988 Preamble to the European Trade Mark 
Directive and the explanatory memorandum of the BTA 1971 
(Trb, 1962 no.58, Pt A, introduction, paraA), 
27 See the 1988 Preamble to the European Trade Mark 
Directive, fn.26 above; the 1993 Preamble to the Community 
Trade Mark Regulation; HagII, C-10/89 [1992] N.J. 743 (ECJ, 
October 17, 1990), at [13]; Loendersloot, C-349195 [1999] N.}. 
216 (ECJ, November 11,1997), at [22]; Merz & Krell, C-517/99 
[2002] N.J. 140 (ECJ, Oetobe, 4, 2001), at [21]. 
28 See §§15-20 TRIPs. 
29 Explanatory memorandum of the BTA 1971, fn.26 above; 
Nijs v Ciba-Geigy ("Tanderif'), A 82/2 [1985] N.]. 101, AA 
1985/28 (Opinion of Attorney-General Berger for Benelux Court 
of Justice, July 9, 1984), at [10J, (13); Philip Mom's v BAT 
("laM"), A 87/2 [1989] N.J. 299 (Benelux Court of Justice, 
November 18,1988), at [25J. 
30 Unofficial translation of the opinion of Attorney-General 
Berger in Nijs v Ciba-Geigy, fn.29 above, at [13]: "Daa~ee 
wordt deze bepaling van merkenrecht haar maatschappehJke 
plaats gewezen: de handel en met name in casu de concurren-
tiestrijd, de mededinging in het handelsverkeer" (in Dutch). 
31 Unofficial translation ofK.-H. Fezer, Markellrecht (2001), 
§14 MarkenG nO.40: "Wie im Wettbewerbsrecht wird auch in 
Markenrecht mit dem erfordenis des Handelns im geschiiftlichen 
Verkehr zum Ausdriick gemacht, dass das Wettbewerbs-
und Markenrecht sich auf den wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb 
beziehen und das Marktverhalten von Untemehmen regelen" 
(in German). 
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situations, which obviously include, although not 
exclusively, the personal and private domain. 
This is also acknowledged in US trade mark law, since 
15 U.s.C. §III4(I), §II25 and §II27 only allow trade 
mark infringement in case of "use in commerce" and 
exempt non-commercial use from trade mark liability." 
Society's aim to confine trade mark law to the 
commercial domain is also illustrated by the framework 
of national and European legislation regarding (the 
scope of) trade mark protection, because both the 
(positively formulated) content of the trade mark 
right and the (negatively formulated) limitations 
thereof contain specifically designed use in commerce 
requirements. 33 In this respect, the omission of a use in 
commerce requirement in Art.5-5 does not fit in and is 
in clear contradiction to the commercial domain of trade 
mark law and its underlying rationale of only allowing 
trade mark protection in cases of infringing use in the 
course of trade. 
Moreover, the need to confine trade mark law to 
the commercial domain is even more necessary if 
the scope of trade mark protection is extended to 
situations of infringing use "other than for the purposes 
of distinguishing goods or services", which goes beyond 
the traditional scope of European trade mark law and 
TRIPs (see above). In this respect (and compared to 
the traditional infringement provisions of Art.5-I and 
5-2), the need to confine Art.5-5 to "use in commerce" 
is not less but even more necessary, which makes it so 
hard to comprehend why the European legislature (and 
the Benelux negotiators) failed to incorporate a use in 
commerce requirement in Art.S-S. 
The potential negative impact on freedom of 
speech and society 
Without a use in commerce requirement the current 
Art.5-5 of the European Trade Mark Directive 
effectively provides a virtual unlimited scope of trade 
mark infringement. It could for instance even intrude 
on, harass or apply to the personal and private domain, 
which could have a negative impact on freedom of 
speech and society as a whole.34 
32 See~ e.g. Mascercard Inc'! Inc v Nader 2000 Primary Committee 
Inc. 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. March 8, 2004); Taubman Co 
v Webfeats, No.01-2648/2725 (6th Cir., February 7, 2003). 
Compare the statement of the US AIPPI Working Group RepOrt 
on AIPPI Q 188, Conflicts between trade mark protection and free 
speech (2005), pp.2 and 4: "In federal trademark dilution claims, 
in contrast, classifying speech as commercial or noncommercial is 
crucial since noncommercial speech is expressly exempted from 
FTDA coverage. Mixed commerciallnoncommercial speech is 
classified as noncommercial. Matte!, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 
296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002)." 
33 With regard to the content of the trade mark right, compare 
Art.5-lA and B, 5-2 European Trade Mark Directive, Art.9-lA, 
Band C Community Trade Mark Regulation, and Art. 13-Al A, 
Band C (and until 2004 13-Al D as well) Benelux Trade Mark 
Act. With regard to trade mark limitations compare Arts 6 and 
7 European Trade Mark Directive, Arts 12 and 13 Community 
Trade Mark Regulation, and Arts 13-A7, 8 and 9 Benelux Trade 
Mark Act. 
34 Freedom of expression is protected for example in 
the First Amendment to the US Constitution, §7 Dutch 
Constitution, An.l0 European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") and 
There is a considerable amount of Benelux literature 
on the need to confine trade mark protection to 
infringing use in the course of trade.35 A convincing 
example regarding artistic speech is the case SkollDe 
Wijs about a satirical song which ironically claimed 
that Skol was quite an awful beer and resulted in the 
artist receiving a subpoena for trade mark infringement 
from the Skol brewery immediately after his first 
show." Perhaps more boring, but equally important, 
is educational use, which according to Van Manen does 
not constitute trade mark use in the course of trade. 37 
Van Manen also mentions other examples of situations 
which do not constitute commercial trade mark use, 
stating that Andy Warhol's litho of a can of Campbell's 
soup or a fiyer with the title "Shell helps Apartheid" do 
not constitute trade mark infringement. 
A recent example of Benelux trade mark law 
overstepping its boundaries and applying trade mark 
infringement to non-trade situations surfaced in 2005 
in Super de Boer v Milieudefensie. It was all about the 
Dutch supermarket giant Super de Boer receiving severe 
criticism from an environmental group (Milieudefensie) 
for selling grapes that exceeded normal levels of 
(poisonous) pesticides." 
The Dutch supermarket giant was not amused and 
decided to take the case to court, which resulted, 
inter alia, in the environmental group receiving an 
trade mark injunction order, because it was held 
that-while reference to the name Super de Boer was 
acceptable-using the Super de Boer trade mark logo on 
its flyers was not necessary and constituted trade mark 
infringement under Art.l3-AI D BT A. 39 
Although one can agree or disagree about the 
assessment that merely referring to the trade mark owner 
is sufficient (and fair use), and use of the trade mark 
Art.19 International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights 
("ICCPR"). 
35 See W. C. Van Manen, "Merk en mening sinds de 
richtlijn" (1997) 4 Intellectuele Eigendom en Reclamerecht 121; 
D. J. G. Visser, "Merkenrecht en vri;heid van meningsuiting" 
(1993) 6 Mediaforum 62; Ch. Gielen and L. Wichers Hoeth, 
Merkenrecht (1992), nos 1177-1180; D. W. F. Verkade, 
"Intellectuele eigendom, mededinging en informatievrijheid" 
(inaugural lecture, Leiden University, 1990), p.41; R. E. Ebbink, 
"Ander gebruik van andermans merk in de Benelux" (1990) 1 
BMM Bulletin 31; W. C. Van Manen, "GroBe Marken fangen viel 
Wind. Benelux Markenschutz und MeinungsauBerungsfreiheit" 
[1986] GRUR Int. 25; W. C. Van Manen, "Grote merken 
vangen veel wind" [1985] Bijb!ad biJ de indusm"ille eigendom 203; 
Pels Rijcken, "Merkenrecht en geneesmiddelen" [1985] Bijblad 
bi} de industriiile eigendom 229. 
36 Visser, fn.35 above. See also the book by M. Langeveld, 
Bucker? Proost! Merkgebruik door cabaretiers (Otto Cramwinckel 
Publishers, 2004), pp.15-1S, 90-92, which also gives other 
examples of artistic speech and discusses the issue of trade mark 
use by comedians. 
37 Explanatory memorandum of the BTA 1971, fn.26 above, 
no.58, Art.13; Van Manen, "Grote merken", fn.35 above, at 
p.206; Van Manen, "GroBe Marken", fn.35 above, at p.30. 
38 Super de Boer v Milieudefensie KG 04/2632 (President of the 
District Court Amsterdam, January 6,2005). 
39 This judgment obviously does not concur with the views of 
the US AIPPI Working Group Report on AIPPI Q 188, fn.32 
above, at p.5, stating: "If no likelihood of confusion is present, 
even a defendant's prominent appropriation of plaintiff's trade 
slogan will not give rise to trademark liability. See Mastercard 
Int'/ Inc. v. NadeJ' 2000 Pdmary Committee Inc. 2004 WL 434404 
(S.D.N.Y. March 8 2004)." 
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logo was not necessary to voice their environmental 
and public health concerns, the fundamental objection 
against this judgment is, however, that non-commercial 
use of a trade mark for environmental speech on 
a website, flyers and posters cannot constitute trade 
mark infringement in the first place.40 Regulating non-
commercial speech falls outside the jurisdiction of trade 
mark law, but should instead-if false, misleading, 
tarnishing or defamatory-only be adjudicated by 
general tort law and rules prohibiting defamation, libel 
and slander. This, however, was not the case in Super de 
Boer v Milieudefensie, since all claims about the grapes 
exceeding normal levels of (poisonous) pesticides were 
deemed to be true, factual and based on independent 
reliable tests. 
The European Court of Justice is also aware of the 
delicate balance between society's general interest in 
freedom of speech and the use in commerce requirement 
in trade mark law. In his Opinion on Arsenal/Reed 
Attorney-General Ruiz Jarabo Colomer also refers to 
the Andy Warhol example and states that: 
"It would appear that equally legitimate is the private use 
that someone might make of the mark BMW on a key 
ring, from which he gains no material advantage other 
than the convenience of having the keys that he habitually 
uses on one holder, as is the use which, in the 1960s, Andy 
Warhol made of the Campbell brand of soup in several 
of his paintings, from which, obviously, he obtained an 
economic benefit. A radical conception of the scope of 
the rights of the proprietor of the trade mark could have 
deprived contemporary art of some eminently expressive 
pictures, an important manifestation of 'pop art'. Other 
non-trade uses, such as those for educational purposes, 
also fall outside the scope of the protection afforded to 
the proprietor" .4' 
The examples mentioned above illustrate the fundamen-
tal interest of freedom of speech in society's political, 
artistic, scientific and ideological domains.42 Van Manen 
once wrote that competition law is a minefield of limita-
tions of freedom of speech." In the present author's 
view, protecting the interest of trade mark owners 
against infringing use in the course of trade is and 
should be allowed, and legislators are right to do so, 
because in commercial speech (i.e. trade mark law) the 
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion gener-
ally outweighs the public interest in free expression.4" 
But if there is non-trade mark use and non-trade use, 
and consumer confusion and trade mark dilution is 
40 Analysis of the Super de Boer v Milieudefensie verdict also 
raises questions regarding the legal grounds of the injunction 
order: how could the court grant an injunction order on the 
basis of Art.13-AI D BTA (verdict, at [7)), if-according to the 
verdict at [IL]-the plaintiff only had a Community trade mark? 
Perhaps the verdict failed to mention Benelux trade mark rights, 
but it is clear that without a registered Benelux trade mark, there 
is no Benelux trade mark protection, which means the verdict 
is flawed either way (and the injunction order on the basis of 
Art.13-Al D BTA should have never been issued). 
41 Arsenal v Reed, (C-206/01) (Opinion of Attorney-General 
RuizJarabo Colomer for the ECJ, June 13, 2002). 
42 Van Manen, "Grote merken", fn.35 above, at p.203. 
43 Van Manen, "Merk en mening", fn.35 above, at p.121. 
44 See, e.g. Taubman Co v Webfeats, fn.32 above: "The 
Lanham Act is constitutional because it only regulates 
commercial speech, which is entitled to reduced protections 
under the First Amendment". 
subsequently not an issue, trade mark infringement is 
consequently not applicable, because trade mark pro-
tection, as a part of competition law, is and should be 
confined to infringing use in the course of trade, and 
does not extend to non-trade situations.45 And although 
this is generally safe-guarded by the existing framework 
of use in commerce requirements in European Trade 
Mark legislation (see above), it has been a huge mistake 
not to include a use in commerce requirement in Art.5-5 
of the European Trade Mark Directive. The virtually 
unlimited scope of Art.5-5 basically means that (at least 
in the Benelux: see below) trade mark owners can sue 
anybody anytime for any non-commercial use of a sign 
other than for the purpose of distinguishing goods or services 
that might be considered to take unfair advantage of, or 
is detrimental to (the distinctive character or the repute 
of) a trade mark. And while it is obvious that an action 
for infringement is only allowed if all requirements of 
Art.5-5 are met, this does not fundamentally change the 
fundamental problem that without a use in commerce 
requirement, the scope of Art.5-5 could also extent to 
non-trade situations, apply to the personal and private 
domain and jeopardise freedom of speech. 
This also means that the responsibility of protecting 
freedom of speech is entirely dependent on the 
interpretation of the other requirements incorporated in 
Art.5-5, such as the required proof of (actual or potentiaV 
damage and the requirement that the infringement must 
occur without due cause. But both requirements were 
not designed, and are not able, to prevent Art.5-5 
from extending its scope to non-trade situations, since 
both requirements are also mentioned in Art.5-2 of the 
European Trade Mark Directive, which does contain a 
use in commerce requirement.46 
While it is clear that proving any (actual or potentiaV 
damage to the trade mark, depends on the facts and 
merits of each case, it is also clear from the text 
of Art.5-5 that it is not necessary to establish that 
the infringing use is detrimental against (the distinctive 
character or reputation of) the registered trade mark, 
because establishing an unfair advantage is sufficient, 
which is likely to increase rather than decrease the scope 
of trade mark infringement in Art.5-5." 
45 Tsoutsanis, fn.6 above, at p.8. It should be stressed that, 
while (at least in the author's view) trade mark infringement 
should not extent to the personal and private domain, it is 
obvious that any behaviour in the personal and private domain 
remains subject to law in general, including actions of general 
civil tort and the rules prohibiting defamation, including libel 
and slander. 
46 This despite the possibilities of re-interpreting the valid 
reason defence in Art.13-AI D BTA, which has been proposed 
by Visser, fn.3S above, at p.65, and the proposal by Verkade 
to allow minor (one-time) infringements, as proposed in his 
lecture "Het belang van een bagatel" (Leiden, Ars Aequi Libri, 
2002). Both proposals do not aim to loosen existing statutory 
infringement provisions (which happens with the omission of a 
use in commerce requirement in Art.S-S) but rather provide for 
a wider statutory defence of free speech, allowing for (more) 
freedom of (commercial) speech, even in case of a clear-cut 
infringement in the course of trade. See Tsoutsanis, fn.6 above. 
47 One could also argue that this requirement of Art.5-S makes 
little sense at all without a use in commerce requirement, because 
in case of non-trade mark use and non-trade use, any use in 
the meaning of Art.5-5 is (1) not able to be detrimental to 
the distinctive character of the trade mark, since it pertains to 
use of a sign other than for the purpose of distinguishing goods 
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The same applies to the requirement that the 
infringement must occur without due cause. Although 
this statutory defence aims to exempt infringements 
which could be justified by a valid reason, it can not 
prevent Art.5-S from extending to non-trade situations. 
It is also unlikely that every free speech defence would 
qualify as a due cause within the meaning of Art.5-S 
and could prevent trade mark infringement, especially 
if the trade mark owner submits convincing evidence 
that the infringing use is detrimental against or takes 
unfair advantage of the registered trade mark. Moreover, 
one should note that the Benelux interpretation of 
the valid reason defence is rather strict, since the 
Benelux Court of Justice has decided that a valid reason 
defence is generally only available if the defendant 
proves an "insurmountable necessity" to use or refer 
to the trade mark. 48 Owing to the strict Benelux 
interpretation of the valid reason defence, it is likely 
to increase rather than decrease the scope of trade 
mark infringement in Art.5-S; this also means that-at 
least in the Benelux-the chances of succeeding in a 
free speech defence are rather uncertain. 49 Above all, 
however, the key problem remains that Art.5-S fails to 
incorporate a use in commerce requirement: if Art.5-5 
did have a use in commerce requirement, 99 per cent 
of all non-commercial (political, ideological, scientific, 
artistic, private and personal) use would not fall with the 
scope for trade mark infringement in the first place, and 
the need to invoke a constitutional free speech defence 
would not occur. 50 
or services; and (2) is not able to take (unfair) advantage of 
(the distinctive character or the reputation of) the trade mark, 
since non-commercial use will generally not (aim to) achieve a 
(commercial) advantage. In comparison: the same requirement 
that the infringing use must "take unfair advantage of or is 
detrimental to the distinctive character or the repute of the 
trade mark" is also used in Art.5-2 of the European Trade 
Mark Directive, which does not pose any problems since Art.5-2 
pertains to both trade mark use and use in the course of trade. 
48 Claereyn v Klarein [19751 N.J. 472 (Benelux Court of 
Justice, March 1, 1975). It is clear that it is not up to the Benelux 
Court ofJustice, but the European Court of Justice to provide an 
interpretation on the meaning of "without due cause", especially 
since this clause is not only mentioned in Art.5-5, but also in 
Art.5-2 of the European Trade Mark Directive and in Art.9-1 c 
of the Community Trade Mark Regulation. 
49 Another drawback is that the burden of proof for freedom 
of speech would inevitably shift towards the defendant, while in 
the case of a proper use in commerce requirement it is-in order 
to establish (and file for) trade mark infringement-up to the 
trade mark owner (the plaintiff) to establish that the infringing 
use is in the course of trade. 
50 This is proved by the fact that there is so little Benelux 
case law on the issue of free speech and trade mark litigation, 
since the use in commerce requirement was only deleted from 
the Benelux provision of Art.13-Al D BTA after the 2004 
implementation (see above): before that there was little need 
to invoke a free speech defence because Art. 13-Al D ETA was 
(until then) confined to infringing use in the course of trade. 
Compare the German US AIPPI Working Group Report on 
AIPPI Q 188, fn.32 above: "As a result of the fact that non-
commercial activities are excluded from the scope of application 
of MarkenG (AT: the German Trade Mark Act), political or 
scientific statements, or activities by non-profit associations are 
not covered by Mark.enG from the outset (e.g. KG MMR 2002, 
686-oil-of-elf). " 
1996 and 2004: the Benelux implementation 
Despite the fact that Art.5-S is obviously flawed without 
a use in commerce requirement, the Benelux legislature 
actually never noticed until 2001. While the Benelux 
boasted about their success in negotiating the 1988 
European Trade Mark Directive (see above), they were 
slow to implement the Directive, since the revised 
Benelux Trade Mark Act ("BTA") only came into 
force in 1996, three years too late. 51 In the revised 
1996 Benelux Trade Mark Act the old infringement 
provisions of Art.l3-Al and 2 were replaced by four 
new provisions: Art.3-Al A, B, C and D. Article l3-Al 
D BTA was intended as an implementation of Art.5-
S ETMD and as a successor to the old Art.l3-A2 
provision. 
Surprisingly, the 1996 provision of Art. 13-Al D BTA 
did contain a use in commerce requirement, just like its 
1971 predecessor in Art. 13-A2. This initial Benelux 
implementation policy confirms our analysis of the 
negotiation process that the 1988 provision of Art.S-
S ETMD was inspired by the 1971 Benelux provision of 
Art.l3-A2 (see above). No one acruallybothered about 
the 1996 use in commerce requirement of Art.13-Al 
D BTA. And rightly so. Since confining trade mark 
protection to infringing use in the course of trade is 
a traditional and well-established requirement of trade 
mark protection (see above), no questions were asked. 
It was only after the 1997 PumalSabel verdict that 
the Benelux started to realise that only a verbatim 
implementation of the European Trade Mark Directive 
would keep them (and other Member States) on the safe 
side of the fence and away from further clashes with the 
European Court ofJustice (see above).52 New changes 
to legislation were agreed upon in 2001. The 2001 
Protocol to revise the Benelux Trade Mark Act included 
changes to Art.l3-Al D BTA, which adopted a more 
verbatim implementation of Art.S-S of the Directive. 
As a consequence, the use in commerce requirement 
in Art.13-Al D BTA was dropped, because Art.S-S 
mistakenly failed to mention it. In other words: the 
2001 amendments to Art.l3-Al D BTA just made things 
worse. 
But is the Benelux to blame? At the end of the day, 
verbatim implementation of European directives is the 
only safe option for a Member State, because different, 
wrongful, inadequate or non-verbatim implementation 
of directives may result, inter alia, in Francovich state 
liability or in the directive obtaining direct effect. 53 
In that sense, verbatim implementation of European 
directives is the most effective and responsible way to 
transpose European directives into national legislation. 
Responsibility also means, however, that in the case 
of serious doubts about the wording (or translation) 
of a provision, Member States should address those 
issues by communicating their doubts to the European 
51 The implementation deadline of the 1988 European Trade 
Mark Directive was initially set at December 28, 1991 and 
later-in accordance with Art.16~postponed to December 31, 
1992. 
52 See the explanatory memorandum of the 1992 Protocol to 
revise the BTA. 
53 See S. Prechal, Directives in BC Law (2005), pp.73, 216, 
271; Fmllcovich v Italy, (C-6/90 & C-9/90): ECJ, November 19, 
1990. 
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Commission, consulting other Member States or even 
by addressing national or European courts. 54 This is 
what should have happened with Art.S-S. Instead of 
going for a verbatim implementation of an obviously 
flawed provision of the European Trade Mark Directive, 
the Benelux legislature should have communicated their 
doubts to the European Commission, especially since 
Art.5-S was inspired and proposed by the Benelux. The 
Benelux did not do so in 1988 because the Benelux felt 
too victorious, and failed to do so again in 200 I because 
of the aftermath of the PumalSabel controversy. But 
that conclusion may very well be too harsh and discredit 
the Benelux too much, especially because one should 
remember that the responsibility for establishing bullet-
proof European legislation is not the task of a particular 
Member State alone but a joint responsibility of all 
Member States and all European institutions, including 
the European Commission and European Parliament. 
2005 and the Benelux JP Treaty: another 
missed opportunity 
So are the Benelux countries really to blame? One 
could say not until 2003, when a leading Dutch IP 
review published serious criticism on Art.S-S by this 
author, claiming that the omission of a use in commerce 
requirement was wrong, because it was in contradiction 
to the underlying negotiating process of that provision 
and could threaten freedom of speech (see above)." 
The same article also proposed several options for 
improvement, called for new measures by the Benelux 
legislator and urged members of parliament to withdraw 
their approval of the 2001 Protocol to revise the Benelux 
Trade Mark Act." Instead nothing happened: and while 
politicians obviously do not (tend to) read IP reviews, 
Benelux trade mark officials clearly do, but nonetheless 
failed to provide any response or research into the 
matter. It was a missed opportunity. 
Another missed opportunity surfaced in 200S, when 
the Benelux proposed and signed their new Benelux 
IP Treaty on February 2S, 200S.57 The Benelux IP 
Treaty was created mainly because of administrative 
reasons and the need to merge the Benelux Trade Marks 
Office with the Benelux Designs Office. While this also 
resulted in merging the Benelux Trade Marks Act with 
the Benelux Designs Act and incorporating them both in 
the Benelux IP Treaty, it was generally decided to keep 
existing provisions as they are, which basically means 
that there is nothing new. The existing Art. 13-AI D BTA 
is replaced by the virtual identical provision of Art.2.20-
lA of the Benelux IP Treaty. While keeping existing 
provisions as they are is not necessarily a bad thing, 
54 The Benelux Court of Justice for example provides for a 
consultation procedure in case of conflicts or doubts about the 
interpretation of Benelux law: see An.l 0 of the Benelux treaty 
on the establishment and statute of the Benelux Court of Justice, 
Trb. 1965171, and A. Tsoutsanis, Domeillllaamgeschillell: illbreuk, 
onrechtmatige daad en kwade trouw (2003), p.299. 
55 Tsoutsanis, fn.6 above, pp.3-10. Later confirmed by 
Langeveld, fn.36 above, at pp.28-29~ and G. S. P. Vas and 
J. van den Bergh, "De geldige redden" (2003) 2 BMM Bulletin 
81-82. 
56 Tsoutsanis, fn.6 above atpp.9-10. 
57 [2005] Tractatcnblad 96. 
maintaining a provision amid serious legal allegations 
of being obviously flawed and unconstitutional is not 
the most responsible and effective way for legislators 
to sort things out. The Benelux legislator has clearly 
missed another opportunity to confront the controversy 
surrounding Art.5-S ETMD and Art.13-AI D BT A. 
And while solutions are not easy (especially with regard 
to the duty of verbatim implementation of directives), 
merely confronting the issue would have been a major 
step forward, either by addressing the controversy in the 
explanatory memorandum or by mentioning that the 
issue was being reviewed by EU and Benelux officials. 
This, however, did not happen: the Benelux legislator 
remains silent, the Benelux IP Treaty leaves Art.13-
Al D BTA unaltered in Art.2.20-IA and meanwhile 
society is stuck with a trade mark provision which could 
effectively kill freedom of speech, at least in the Benelux. 
Time is running out. 
So what should the Benelux do? Benelux legislators 
should finally confront the Art.5-S controversy and 
assess why Art.5-5 fails to incorporate a use in commerce 
requirement. 58 Since Benelux legislators have ignored 
the Art.S-S controversy too long and too late, it is vital 
that Benelux society and their political representatives 
take a proactive stand towards this issue. In order 
to trigger legislative intervention and in the light 
of the pending national approval procedures of the 
Benelux IP Treaty, every politician in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg should withdraw their 
approval of the 200S Benelux IP Treaty and object 
to the omission of a use in commerce requirement 
in Art.2.20-IA (and the fellow provisions of Art.13-
Al D BTA and Art.S-S ETMD). Benelux society 
and Benelux politicians should also wonder why the 
Benelux countries are the only Member States to have 
apparently implemented Art. S-S of the European Trade 
Mark Directive and why other European Member 
States do confine trade mark infringement to a use 
in commerce requirement. Compare, inter alia, the 
German requirement of "geschiiftlichen Verkehr" in §14-
2 German Trade Mark Act (Markengesetz), the Italian 
clause of "usare nell'attivita economica" in §20-1 Italian 
IP Code (Codice dei Diritto di Proprieta Industriale), the 
Irish confinement of "use in the course of trade" in §14 
Irish Trade Marks Act and the Spanish requirement of 
"el trafico economico" in §34 of the Spanish Trade Mark 
Act (Ley de Marcas). 
2005: between the European constitution and 
European conSCience 
It is vital not only for the Benelux, but also for the 
European Parliament to confront, assess and solve 
the controversy surrounding Art. S-S of the European 
Trade Mark Directive, either by communicating their 
doubts to the European Commission or by adopting a 
(motion for a) resolution. 59 The need for European 
58 And its fellow Benelux provisions of Art. 13-Al D BTA and 
An.2.20-1A. 
59 Although it was decided in Robe/co v Robeco, fn.24 above, at 
[31] that An.5-5 is not covered by Community harmonisation, 
and the EeJ also held that the interpretation of Art.5-5 is up to 
the implementing Member State(s) (i.e. the Benelux) to decide 
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Parliament to finally step in and solve the Art.5-
5 controversy has increased because of the highly 
publicised European constitution, which was put to 
the vote in 2005 in several EU countries. 6o The 
allegation that omitting a use in commerce requirement 
in Art.5-5 of the European Trade Mark Directive is 
an unfortunate mistake which could have a negative 
impact on freedom of speech is not compatible with the 
fact that the same European legislator is boasting about 
(at [35-]-[36]), it is obvious that any intervention and any 
assessment on the wording of Art.5-5 European Trade Mark 
Directive (and its omission of a use in commerce requirement) 
must come from the EU itself, including the European Council, 
the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. 
60 US organisations are generally more active in protecting 
free speech and raising constitutional concerns, also in 
relation to trade mark law: see, e.g. press release of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, "Trademark laws must not 
be used to curtail first amendment", February 17, 2005), at 
www.acltt.orgIFreeSpeechlFreeSpeech.cfm?ID=17508&c=42. 
. . 61 freedom of expression in the European conSTItutlOn. 
While Art.Il,77-2 shows that Europe is committed to 
the protection of intellectual property, Art.I!.71 of 
the very same constitution states that "everyone has 
the right to freedom of expression". 62 Either Europe 
genuinely cares about freedom of expression as its 
proposed European constitution proclaims and admits 
that omitting a use in commerce requirement in Art. 5-5 
of the European Trade Mark Directive is a mistake, 
or Europe has no conscience and should not have a 
constitution at all. 
61 Agreement on the European Constitutional Treaty, October 
29,2004 [2004] O.I- C310/1. 
62 Art.I!.?7 s.2 of the European constitution states: "Intellec-
tual property shall be protected". 
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